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•

—

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20090767-CA

v.
JOHN MCHUGH,
Defendant/Appellant.

—

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3) of the Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended.

ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD ofr REVIEW
1.

The trial court erred when it denied the Defendant's oral Motion to Dismiss or Declare a
Mistrial when Defendant's due process rights were violated as a result of the State's
failure to provide subpoenaed, exculpatory evidence?

2.

The trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion toi dismiss or declare mistrial
when the state failed to comply with Rule 16(a)(1) of the tJtah Rules of Criminal
Procedure which requires the disclosure of recorded statements

3.

Defendant's counsel was ineffective when defense counsel failed to move for
enforcement of defendant's discovery subpoena until afteij the jury trial witnesses had
concluded their testimony, but prior to final oral arguments.
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the
following material or information of which he has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the
guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made
available to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of
charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to
make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor
such information as required by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any other item of evidence
which the court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in
order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days
before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by
notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at
specified reasonable times and places. The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable
limitations on the further dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to
prevent improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses from harassment,
abuse, or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on the further dissemination of
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videotaped interviews, photographs, or psychological or medical reports.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be
denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further dissemination of discovery be
modified or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may
permit the party to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex
parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records
of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court
that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the
discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;|
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and other bodily materials
which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes,
reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall be given to the accused and his
counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless
relieved by order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of
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pre-trial release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration
along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be subject to such further
sanctions as the court should deem appropriate.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
John McHugh appeals from a jury trial based on the State's failure to provide exculpatory

evidence in violation of the "Brady Rule ", Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and for ineffective assistance of counsel
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court
On June 24, 2009, after a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of making a Terroristic

Threat, a Second Degree Felony.
C.

Statement of Facts

1.

On March 26, 2008, a blocked phone call was received by a secretary at the Wasatch
County School District, Lori Magnusson, where a person stated to her, "The bomb will go
off at 2:00". (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 103-104).

2.

Defendant was charged with making a Terroristic Threat (a second degree felony), on
March 26, 2008. Information, April 2, 2008.

3.

A jury trial was held June 23 and June 24, 2009. (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., cover
page).

4.

Lori Magnusson, was unable to identify the Defendant as the caller or even to recognize
his voice. (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 109, line 8-17).

5.

Sergeant Bradley never found any evidence on the Defendants's subpoenaed phone
records that the Defendant's phone had called the Wasatch County School District or that
4

the phone used the star 67 feature to block the number. (June 23-24, 2008, Official
Trans., page 145-146).
6.

Prior to trial Defendant submitted a subpoena duces tecum for the jail recordings
specifically, and any other electronic recordings of the Defendant, John McHugh. (June
23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 314, line 6-8).

7.

Defendant's trial counsel moved the court for "some sanation if not dismissal, [then]
perhaps a mistrial" for plaintiff not providing the requested jail telephone recordings that
would contain a "statement by Tammy Baker on the phone that would have confirmed
our theory." (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 314, line 15-24).

8.

This was based on Defendant having issued "a subpoena duces tecum for the jail
recordings and any recordings, electronic recordings of John McHugh while he was in
jail. Deputy Hales verifie[d] that Mr. McHugh did make phone calls and that those phone
calls would have been recorded as a matter of course. However, those phone call
recordings were never produced to [Defendant's counsel]." (June 23-24, 2008, Official
Trans., page 314, line 6-12).

9.

The judge made it clear to Defendant's trial counsel, "If the defendant wanted discovery,
submit your discovery request. If you don't get the information you've asked for, file you
[sic] bill of particulars and I go over them and I'm one that 99 9/10 of the time will tell
the State, provide what's been asked for, if you've got anything relating to it, provide it."
(June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 315, line 9-14).

10.

The court denied Defendant's oral motion. (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 315,
line 25; page 316, line 1-2).
5

11.

Defendant was found guilty for making a Terroristic Threat on June 24, 2009. (June 2324, 2008, Official Trans., page 347, line 2-3).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Declare

Mistrial when properly subpoenaed recordings of the defendant were never provided to the
Defendant, thus violating his right to due process. Additionally, the state's withholding of the
subpoenaed recordings is a violation of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require the
prosecutor to disclose to the defense, upon request, relevant written or recorded statements of the
defendant. Trial counsel for the Defendant failed to secure these recordings. Under an objective
standard or reasonableness, any attorney would have done something more to follow up with the
subpoena duces tecum, whether that be filing a Bill of Particulars, or a Motion in Limine before
the trial got underway, let alone finished. The defendant was facing charges of making a
Terroristic Threat. The content of the recorded calls made by him to the outside worlds would be
of great importance to law enforcement. These recordings were significant pieces of evidence,
and became more significant when the calls were to the key prosecution witness. The
subpoenaed recordings would have shown that the state's key witness, Tammy Marie Baker, had
given contradictory statements prior to her testimony at trial. Her telephone statements with the
accused while in jail, and recorded, would disclose that she was sorry for bringing so much
trouble to the accused as she knew it was not him that had made the call to the Wasatch County
School District, and it was likely that it was some of the many children who congregate at her
home. She also stated she made up the fact the accused had made an admission to her. She
further stated that the reason she did it was because she was angry with the accused over their
6

breakup. Further she stated that she intended to tell the police what she had done and why, and
she would make a full retraction of her original evidence. Had the recordings been produced the
Defendant would have had the opportunity cross-examine her over these admissions and the jury
could decide her credibility and reliability as a witness. The State's case was tenuous at best;
revealing the deception of the State's key witness was critical to the defendant and would likely
have changed the outcome of the proceedings. The subpoenaed recordings would very likely
have shown that the State's case was tenuous at best, revealing the deception of the State's key
witness, and very likely change the outcome of the proceeding. Based upon the above, this court
should reverse the trial courts ruling when the trial court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the Case or Declare a Mistrial for the State's refusal to provide exculpatory evidence and further
this Court should dismiss this case due to defense counsel's ineffective assistance.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S ORAL
MOTION TO DISMISS OR DECLARE A MISTRIAL WHEN DEFENDANT'S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE STATE'S FAILURE
TO PROVIDE SUBPOENAED, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE.

A. Relevant Law
This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling when it refused to dismiss the State's
case because the Defendant was denied due process. "Suppression of evidence favorable to the
accused is itself sufficient to amount to a denial of due process." Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815
at 820. The law has long held "that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused, upon request, violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland,
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373 U.S. 83, at 87. This case gave rise to the "Brady claim." A Brady claim can be made when
"the government failed to accede to a defense request for disclosure of some specific kind."
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, at 103-104.
The duty to disclose also includes a "duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the
others acting on the government's behalf." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419. This duty, through
the prosecutor, is extended to any party acting on the government's behalf. Therefore, the
prosecutor himself need not have actual knowledge of the potentially exculpatory evidence. In
defending the implications of this rule, the Wlntley court stated:
The state . . . would prefer an even more lenient rule. It pleads that some of
the favorable evidence in issue here was not disclosed even to the prosecutor until
after trial, and it suggested . . . that it should not be held accountable under Bagley
and Brady for evidence known only to police investigators and not to the
prosecutor. To accommodate the State in this manner would, however, amount to
a serious change of course from the Brady line of cases. In the State's favor it may
be said that no one doubts that police investigators sometimes fail to inform a
prosecutor of all they know. But neither is there any serious doubt that
"procedures and regulations can be established to carry [the prosecutor's] burden
and to insure communication of all relevant information on each case to every
lawyer who deals with it." Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,154 (1972).
Since, then, the prosecutor has the means to discharge the government's Brady
responsibility if he will, any argument for excusing a prosecutor from disclosing
what he does not happen to know about boils down to a plea to substitute the
police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the final arbiters
of the government's obligation to ensure fair trials.
M a t 438.
In Kyles v. Whitley, the defendant was accused and convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to death. Id. "Because the State withheld evidence, its case was much stronger, and
the defense case much weaker, than the full facts would have suggests." Id Ultimately, the
Court reversed and remanded the court of appeals affirmation of the conviction.
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This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling and dishiiss the State's case because, as
in Kyles v. Whitley, the State withheld evidence, making its case much stronger, and substantially
weakening the Defendant's case. The Defendant's case sought ijo show Casey Mair, Brandy
Baker, and in particular, Tammy Baker lied about the Defendants supposed confession. This
alleged confession was the crux of the State's argument. Without the confession, there was no
case.
During this trial, Defense counsel was able to show Lori Magnusson, was not able to
identify the Defendant as the caller and failed to recognize his vcjice earlier. (June 23-24, 2008,
Official Trans., page 109, line 8-17.) Defense counsel also showed Sergeant Bradley never
found, in the phone records of the Defendant's phone that the Defendant's phone had called the
school, or had even used the star 67 feature. (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 145-146).
The State's only piece of evidence to connect the Defendant with the phone call to
Wasatch County School District was Tammy Baker's testimony 6f the Defendant's confession.
Knowing this, Defendant sought the recordings of the telephone Conversations the Defendant had
with Tammy Baker while he was in jail. Officer Jeremy Hales w^s asked "would (phone calls
from John McHugh that left the jail to Tammy Baker or others) hkve been recorded?" (June 2324, 2008, Official Trans., page 305, line 14-15). To which Officer Jeremy Hales answered
"those phone calls are all recorded that leave the jail." Id. at 22-23. With these recordings, the
Defense would have been able to show the clear contradictions of Tammy Baker's testimony.
The State may respond to this argument that Brady should not be applied because the
prosecutor apparently did not hear the recordings, and seems to h$ve been unaware of their
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existence. This argument fails however when precedent law is considered. The duty to disclose
also includes a "duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government's behalf." Kylesv. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419. This duty, through the prosecutor, is
extended to any party acting on the government's behalf. Therefore, the prosecutor himself need
not have actual knowledge of the potentially exculpatory evidence.
The prosecutor and the jail were put on notice of the potentially exculpatory evidence by
the Defendant's subpoena duces tecum for the jail recordings specifically, and any other
electronic recordings of the Defendant. Id. at 314 at 6-8. Therefore, while the prosecutor and
government may have not had actual knowledge of what was contained in the recordings, they
had been put on notice, thereby giving them constructive knowledge. Since the jail had the
recording in question, and obviously the jail system is a government agent, there was a duty to
disclose. This duty is even more apparent after the subpoena duces tecum was served to provide
these recordings.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS OR DECLARE MISTRIAL WHEN THE STATE FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH RULE 16(A)(1) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
WHICH REQUIRES THE DISCLOSURE OF RECORDED STATEMENTS
A. Relevant Law

The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require the prosecutor to disclose to the defense upon
request, relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or information of which he has
knowledge. Rule 16. If the prosecutor, and by extension, the government, failed in doing so, it
would "cast the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with
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standards of justice, even though . . . his action [are] not "the result of guile."" Brady v. State,
226 Md. 422 at 427, 174 A.2d 167 at 169 (1961).
Under Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the State was required to
disclose all the recorded statements of the Defendant. While the state may argue that telephonic
recordings are not the type of "statements" referred to in Rule 16, the rule specifies that upon
request, "relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant" must be disclosed to the
Defendant. In this case, because the Defendant served a subpoena duces tecum specifically for
the Defendant's jail recordings, and any other electronic recordings, the recordings of the
telephonic statements became relevant; regardless as to whether or not the same had been
reviewed. (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 314, line 6-8). The State never provided these
recordings. Id. at 304,16-20. Since the State never provided the Requested recordings, the court
should have sanctioned the prosecution by granting the Defendarit's motion to dismiss or at least
declare mistrial.
III.

DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE WH^N DEFENSE COUNSEL
FAILED TO MOVE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF DEFENDANT'S DISCOVERY
SUBPOENA UNTIL AFTER THE JURY TRIAL WITNESSES HAD CONCLUDED
THEIR TESTIMONY, BUT PRIOR TO FINAL ORAL ARGUMENTS.
A. Relevant Law
"In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of cotmsel claim pursuant to the

Sixth Amendment, a defendant must show [1] that trial counsel's performance was deficient in
that it 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,' and [^] that the deficient performance
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prejudiced the outcome of the trial." State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App. 1994),
quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
Under the first requirement, "[t]he proper standard forjudging attorney performance is
that of reasonably effective assistance, considering all the circumstances." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669. "When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness
of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. While no comprehensive list of what makes counsel
ineffective exists, the guide to be used is "its purpose - to ensure a fair trial." Id. at 686. The
benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result. Id.
The proper standard with regard to the showing of prejudice, "requires the defendant to
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different." Id. "A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
Trial counsel in Defendant's case was ineffective because they failed to gather key
evidence which they were aware of, evidence that very likely would have changed the outcome
of the trial. In this case, Defendant's trial counsel moved the court for "some sanction if not
dismissal, [then] perhaps a mistrial." (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 314, line 23-24).
This was based on Defendant having issued "a subpeona duces teum for the jail recordings and
any recordings, electronic recordings of John McHugh while he was in jail. Deputy Hales
verifiefd] that Mr. McHugh did make phone calls and that those phone calls would have been
12

recorded as a matter of course. However, those phone call recordings were never produced to
[Defendant's counsel]." Id .at 314,6-12.
The judge denied the request to impose sanctions, grant ^ mistrial or declare mistrial. Id.
at 315, 25; 316, 1-2. However, the trial court made it clear to Defendant's trial counsel of this
error by stating, "If the defendant wanted discovery, submit youij discovery request. If you don't
get the information you've asked for, file you [sic] bill of particulars and I go over them and I'm
one that 99 9/10 of the time will tell the State, provide what's be^n asked for, if you've got
anything relating to it, provide it." Id. at 315, 9-14.
In this matter, Defense counsel failed to take any sort offyasicmaneuvers in obtaining
critical recordings. As the judge stated, "you can't come in after (everybody is finished and make
the request that somehow you should have been given things that! you weren't even in light of the
fact that you filed a subpoena. Since you filed a subpoena, he's your witness, you need to go
over and talk to him about what he's got. If there became a problem with it, then it should have
been brought to the attention of the Court." Id. at 315, 18-24. Or in short, "it's too late." Id. By
the language of the judge's response, and the basic level of instrubtion contained therein, this
Court can be assured defense counsel fell below fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.
Had Defense Counsel obtained the subpoenaed recording^, there is "reasonable
probability" that the result of the proceeding would have been different. "A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in ihe outcome." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686. Given Tammy Baker's testimony included an alleged
confession from the Defendant, her testimony was of paramount importance to the State's case.
There is a very likely possibility the recorded conversations betwden John McHugh and Tammy
13

Baker, while he was in jail, would include a statement by Ms. Baker that would have confirmed
the Defendant's position. (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 314, line 15-16). While
counsel did manage to build a case, showing Tammy Baker's alternative agenda, it fell short
because of the failure to gather this crucial evidence. The lack of showing for such telling
evidence gives rise to a probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different
but for this lacking, surely confidence in the outcome has been undermined. Therefore, this
Court should reverse the trial court's ruling due to ineffective counsel's failure to enforce the
Defendant's subpoena.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred by denying the defendant's right to due process by denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Declare Mistrial and erred in failing to enforce Rule 16 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The failure to gather key evidence, and ensure the matter was
addressed in a timely manner is itself clear evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Therefore, in order to ensure due process for the defendant, to ensure the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure are properly enforced, and to ensure the Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
effective counsel is protected, this Court should dismiss the State's Case.
Respectfully submitted this ifaa^:
(fa day of A iA>

a

i

_,2010.

SNA~M. B^CEMYI
Counsel for Appellant^6hn McHugh
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would you please?

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT

Thank you.
LORI MAGNUSSON

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
having been first duly sworn, testifie
STATE OF UTAH,

CaseNo.091401434FS

4

upon h e r o a t h a s

5

THE COURT:

follows:

Have a s e a t r i g h t

over here

please

Appellate Case No. 20090767

Plaintiff,

6
Volume I ofll

V

7

JOHNMcHUGH,
Defendant.

With Keyword Index

JURY TRIAL JUNE 23, & 24, 2009

BY MS. LAKE:

9

Q

Could you p l e a s e s t a t e y o u r name and o c c u p a t i o n ?

A

L o r i Magnusson,

11

BEFORE
TFIE HONORABLE GARY D. STOTT

s e c r e t a r y a t t h e Wasatch School

District.

12

Q

And how l o n g have you h e l d t h a t

13

A

About f o u r

14

Q

What a r e some of your

15

A

To a n s w e r t h e phones and t o g r e e t p e o p l e a s t h e y

position?

years.
responsibilities?

16

come i n t h e door a n d , you know, do some f i l e s

17

w h a t e v e r t h e s u p e r v i s o r s ask me t o d o .

IB
19

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
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DIRECT EXAMINATION

8

10

c

ma'am.

Thank you.

and k i n d of

And were you working i n t h a t c a p a c i t y on March 2 6

Q

of 2 0 0 8 :

20

A

21

Q

Did you r e c e i v e any c o n c e r n i n g c a l l t h a t

22

A

Yes, I

Q

And what phone number d i d you r e c e i v e t h a t c a l l or.

23
24
25

I was.
day?

did.

What i s y o u r number?
A

I u s u a l l y l o o k a t t h e phone b e f o r e I p i c k i t up an
1C

J

1

that one - oh, our phone number is 654-0280.

2

probably, I don't know, a hundred lines that come into that

2

3

district office though.

3

A

Right.

A

Q

So you d i d n ' t detect any kind of a Southern accent

4
5

Q

There are

1

But that's the number you received the call on,

correct?

5

Q

Okay, and you previously testified to your

recollection that voice didn't have an accent?

a Louisiana accent in that voice?

6

A

Yes.

6

A

No.

7

Q

Approximately what time did this concerning call

7

Q

Okay.

8

come in?
Somewhere between 12:00, probably, and 12:20,

It's also true that when you were

8

interviewed by the law enforcement officers that they played

9

some examples of John McHugh's voice for you to listen to; i

9

A

10

12:30.

11

Q

And how do you have a recollection of the time?

11

A

Yes.

12

A

I remember that it was before lunch and, you know,

12

Q

And you listened to John McHugh's voice on a

10

that correct?

13

you start getting hungry and it's close to lunchtime and it

13

recording?

14

was before that so...

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And it's also true that you were not able to

15
16
17

Q

All right.

And if you would, as precisely as you

can, state for the jury what that caller said to you.
A

16

The caller said, "The bomb will go off at 2:00."

identify Mr. McHugh's voice as the voice on that phone?

17

A

That's correct.

18

And you know, I tried to get a response from that by saying

18

Q

And that's still your testimony today?

19

excuse me, like, to kind of get him to talk to me or

19

A

Yes.

Q

All right.

20

something and there was no response, they were gone.

21

tell by the phone the call had cut off and it was gone.

I could

20

it was a prank but you thought better to follow through, so
went to your supervisor.

22

Q

Approximately how long was the call?

22

23

A

Seconds.

23

24

Q

And were you able to tell whether at was a male or

24

25

female caller?

25
104

Now, you state that first you thought

21

A

I knew you had to follow through.

the school district.
Q

It was a call t

It impacted everyone.

And this was to the school districts main, central
1C

1

A

Correct.

2

Q

And he handed you his phone.

2

you did though is you made some phone calls to numbers that

3

A

He had a phone with him when he was arrested.

3

were in Mr. McHugh's telephone records for calls placed from

Q

And you used that phone to - did you use that phone

4

a

5

to look up whether a call had been made from that phone on

6

March 26 or did you use his records from Nextel?

7
8
9

A

j

I actually checked the call logs on the phone but

they didn 't go back far enough.
Q

That's jumping ahead a little bit.

Ultimately what

A

that phone number immediately before and immediately after

5

that 12:07 call to the school district.

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

And you say half hour to an hour before or half

8

So there was no call found on the actual phone that

Q

hour or to an hour afterwards.

9

A

Yes.

10

showed on March 26 at around 12:07 p.m. that he called the

10

Q

But not many hours before or many hours afterward.

11

school district?

11

A

No.

12

Q

So from March 26 until April 1, 2008, that 5-day

But some of them were the same.

12

A

Correct,

13

Q

Or that that phone called the school district.

13

period, did you look at all of the calls from Mr. McHugh's

14

A

On the phone, no.

14

phone number that were made during that time period?

Q

Regardless of who may have used it, that phone

15

A

No.

16

Q

Did you look at any of the calls that were made

15
16

didn't sh ow any record of it.

17

A

No.

18

Q

It also didn't show whether somebody punched in

19
20
21
22

star 67 first before dialing the number?
A

I don't know without - I don't know that it would

show that anyway but...
Q

Let me ask you this, what about the records you

23

obtained from Nextel?

24

first before the school district number?

25

A

Did they show that star 67 was dialed

I don't believe they showed that information.

17

from before March 26 other than the one or two immediately

18

before the 12:07 call?

19

A

No, probably not with any scrutiny.

20

Q

So you never checked his phone or his phone records

21

to see if that school district phone number had ever been

22

called before?

23

A

Not that I recall.

24

Q

Do you have any evidence that Mr. McHugh's phone,

25
145

phone number, phone account shows that that phone number or
146

1

Q

Have you seen those records?

2

A

I have.

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT
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3

Q

Were you aware of those visits or visit?

4

A

I was.

5

Q

Was that visit recorded electronically in any

Case No. 091401434FS
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v

6
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Defendant.

fashjion?

7

h

No, it was not.

8

Q

Was it listened into in any fashion by an officer?

9

ft

I do not believe it was.

2

So you're - you can confirm then that Wasatch

10

JURY TRIAL JUNE 23, &. 24, 2009
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE GARY D. STOTT

11

Countjy Sheriff s Office can confirm through its records that

12

TaroW Baker visited John McHugh during that time period?

13

A

Yes.

14

p

Phone calls from John McHugh that left the jail to

15

TamrrJ Baker or others?

16
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c

1
2

MR. FLINT:

4

I don't know, sir.

17

b

Are there any records of that?

IB

A

I did not search that.

19

Q

Do you have any knowledge of those phone calls?

20

A

Personally I do not have knowledge of those.

21

6

Would those phone calls have been recorded?

22

A

Those phone calls are all recorded that leave the

Q.

So somebody from the sheriff s office would have

23
24
25

jail.

listened to those recordings?

J

There is one other thing I would like

to put on the record though.

3

Were there some?

A

1

the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding the

2

applicability of discovery.

THE COURT:

You may.

3

counsel has indicated is not contained within the

In that rule what defense

MR. FLINT:

When Deputy Hales testified as the

4

requirements of that rule and so for that reason I would

5

objectf to the defendant's objection.

5

representative of the Wasatch County Sheriffs Office, I did

6

ask him about jail records.

7

tecum for the jail records and any recordings, electronic

7

from dounsel, it's the ruling of the Court discovery and

8

recordings of John McHugh while he was in jail.

8

requests for information, that time for that is long past

9

verifies that Mr. McHugh did make phone calls and that those

We did issue a subpoena duces

THE COURT:

6

Deputy Hales

10

phone calls would have been recorded as a matter of course.

11

9

All right.

Considering both responses

after both sides have rested in the case.

If the defendant

10

wanted discovery, submit your discovery request.

However, those phone call recordings were never produced to

11

don't get the information you've asked for, file you bill of

12

us.

12

particulars and I go over them and I'm one that 99 9/10 of

13

they were never provided to us.

13

the time will tell the State, provide what's been asked for,

14

they could have contained exculpatory information such as

14

if you've got anything relating to it, provide it.

15

what we had hoped for would be a statement by Tammy Baker on

15

no aces up sleeves and there's nothing held when you try

16

the phone that would have confirmed our theory.

16

cases before me and I've never liked that notion.

17

received those records despite the subpoena being duly served

17

18

on them and Deputy Hales being here as the representative for

18

moot, it's too late.

19

the sheriff's office and not producing those records, our

19

finished and make the request that somehow you should have

20

objection would be that the State has failed, and the

Although Deputy Hales states he never listened to them,
There's a possibility that

Having not

If you

There's

But the request now before the Court I think is
You can't come in after everybody is

20

been given things that you weren't even in light of the fact

21 ] sheriff's office in particular has failed to provide us with

21

that you filed a subpoena.

22 | potentially exculpatory evidence; therefore creating a

22

your witness, you need to go over and talk to him about what

23 | prejudice that should result in some sanction if not

23

he's got.

24 | dismissal, perhaps a mistrial.

24

have been brought to the attention of the Court.

25

I'm denying the request from the defendant to impose

25 |

MS. LAKE:

But that's our motion.

Your Honor, I believe it's Rule 16 of
314

Since you filed a subpoena, he's

If there became a problem with it, then it should
Therefore,

315

1 I sanctions, denying the request from the defendant to grant a

1

high pitched, nasally, southern accent voice that was never

2 J mistrial or am I going to dismiss the case.

2

identified but we won't allude to the recording that was

3

heard,

The case will go

3

to the jury.

4

have an opportunity to argue your case to the jury and

A

5

they'll make the decision.

5

representation because there's no evidence.

6

is argue the evidence.

the nature and sound of his voice.

6

It's a fact situation case and each of you will

I will address one other issue with counsel.

I

7

want to make sure that I don't have to impose myself during

7

8

closing argument and this observation I make to defense

8

9

counsel, there can be no representation to the jury that the

9

10

defendant's testified in any fashion.

11

he's not testified, he's not taken the stand.

He hasn't testified,
The fact that

THE COURT:

MR. FLINT:

All you can do

You don't have any evidence about

It'll have to be what Lori Magnusson

testified to and nothing else then.

10
11

I don't know that you can make that

THE COURT:

It was a neutral voice, low, male,

neutral voice.

12

you played a blurb from him on interrogation cannot be used

12

MR. FLINT:

And did not have an accent.

13

as somehow a substitute for him testifying.

13

THE COURT:

And did not have an accent.

I thought about

14

that when the request was made to play the little ditty and

14

MR. FLINT:

We'll limit it exactly to that.

15

decided what I'd do depending on what happened with the case

15

THE COURT:

Just a minute.

16

and so Mr. Flint is well aware of how the rules operate.

16

17

that's all I'm going to say.

MR. FLINT:

And that she was allowed to hear

18

MR. FLINT:

So

17

Judge, the only thing we're going to

18

examples of John McHugh's voice and could not identify that

19

say in closing argument is we'll reread the portion of

19

voice as the voice she heard.

20

Instruction 6, as you listen, keep in mind the defendant has

20

THE COURT:

21

answered the charge by saying not guilty.

21

22

(inaudible) we'll make.

23
24
25

THE COURT:

That's the only

And you're certainly welcome to do

that.
MR. FLINT:

And we may also argue that he has a

You may do that because that's what

the evidence -

22

MR. GRIMES:

23

THE COURT:

Correct.

24

MR. FLINT:

He's the one giving the closing so will

25
316

Yeah, that's their

testimony.

Nothing further. That's a promise.
Okay.

I'll take your word.

you promise to?
317
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

INFORMATION

Plaintiff,

vs.
JOHNM.MCHUGH
3578 South US 40 #2
Hcfaer City, UT 84032
DOB: 07/16/1961,

CASEN0.
Warrantless Arrest
Judge DEREK P. PULLAN

Defendant.
The undersigned TRICTA S. LAKE, Deputy Wasatch Coitnty Attorney, under oath states
on information and belief that the defendant, in Wasatch County, State of Utah, committed the
following crime(s):
COUNT 1: TERRORISTIC THREAT, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-107(l)(a) and (l)(b)(i), as follows: That the above named defendant on or about March 26,
2008, threatened to commit an offense involving bodily injury, death, or substantial property
damage and:
(j) threatened the use of a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10401 or threatened the use of a hoax weapon of mass destruction, as defined in Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-401; or
(ii) acted with intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or lo influence or affect the
conduct of a government or a unit of government.
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This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness(es):
Deputy Jeremy Hales, WASATCH CO SHERIFFS OFFICE
Jason Bradley, HEBER CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
Ryan Yardley, HEBER CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
Authorized 2 April 2008
for presentment and filing:

By / ,

~£S C<t,A.

TRICIA S. LAKE
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
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Edward D.Flint 4573
Jooatoon W. Grimes 10462
Attorneys at Law
455 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City,, Utah 84U1
Telephone: (801) 363-5297
Fax: (801) 532-2063

P. 04
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IN THE PROVO DISTRICT COU|lT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF pTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SUBFOEN4 DUCES TECUM

vs.
JOHNMcHUGH,
Defendant

Criminal Case No. 091401434
Hon. Gary p . Stott

THE STATE OF UTAH TO;
Records Custodian of the Hebcr City Police Department, of 301 South Main Street, Hcber City,
UT 84032.
YOU ARE COMMANDED, pursuant to Rule 14. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure* to produce
and make available for inspection and copying by defendant's attorneys or agents, the following papers,
records and other items described below;
Any and all reports, memos, recordings of interviews, notes, aftd phone messages relating to the
above-mentioned matter;
Any and all documentation provided by internet and/or cell phone providers that relate to John
McHugh;
Any and all papers, clothing, and personal property or John McHugh obtained at the time of his
arrest or after the an-est with or without a warrant;
matter;

AH computers, cell phones, hard drives, and electronic devices relating to the above mentioned
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FAX NO. 4356542947
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and to bring these items on the 23rd day of .Tune, 2009 at the hour of 8:30 a.m., at the Fourth District
Court at 125 North 100 West, Provo, UT 84601, before the Hon. Gary D. Stott, District Court Judge in
regards to the above mentioned matter. Disobedience to this Subpoena may be punished as contempt by
the above Court.
DATED this 4'1'day of June, 2009.

,

Edward D, Flint
Attorney for Defendant

